RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT:
A "PROLOGUE TO A FARCE OR A
TRAGEDY; OR, PERHAPS BOTH"
AMY E. REES
INTRODUCTION

In its theoretical underpinnings, the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA)' responds to the conflux-or perhaps collision-of
the democratic ideals of the founders of American government
and the accountability crisis that has characterized that government over the past thirty-five years. Democratic self-rule is predicated on an assumption that the electorate has the knowledge to
choose intelligently between different governmental options. Such
knowledge is uniformly within governmental control, and FOIA
operates as a mechanism by which the public can obtain otherwise
shielded information about internal governmental operations. After
its enactment in 1966, the need for FOIA became even clearer
with the Watergate crisis and the myriad post-Nixon government
scandals. With that legacy, FOIA exists today to serve the same
interests in public awareness of government activities. The question of whether those interests are actually being furthered, however, is a thorny issue.
In its practical effects, FOIA demonstrates the unwieldiness of
modern legislation's interaction with the extensive administrative
and regulatory scheme into which the political experiment of the
founders has evolved. In a very real sense, particularly in recognition of the extraordinary number of FOIA requests filed each
year, FOIA embodies the applicability in the mid-1990s of the
basic definition of our government as one "of the people, by the
people, and for the people."2 The emphatic political rhetoric of
James Madison is often cited as the purpose of the Act:

1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
2. President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), reprinted in 2
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRr NGS (1859-1865) at 536 (P. Fehrenbacher ed.,
1989).
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A popular Government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy;
or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; And
a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives

In fact, FOIA has rarely if ever been used as a powerful external
check on governmental affairs. Rather, the typical FOIA request is
made by a wily civil litigant circumventing traditional discovery
rules, a corporate counsel in search of competitors' financial information, or a conspiracy theorist demanding operational files of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on himself or other players in
covert intelligence maneuvers in Cuba.4

Assuming one of the nine exemptions5 to mandatory FOIA
3. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in THE
COMPLETE MADISON 337 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953), cited in Elias Clark, Holding Government Accountable: The Amended Freedom of Information Act, 84 YALE LJ. 741, 769
(1975); Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the
Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMoRY LJ. 649, 653 (1984).
Also cited in A. Michael's Piano, Inc. v. FTC, 18 F.3d 138, 140-41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct 574 (1994).
4. See, e.g., Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1993); infra text accompanying
notes 53-69; Sullivan v. CIA, 992 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1993); infra text accompanying
notes 70-87; Andrew Blum, Freedom To Battle For Data, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 12, 1990, at
1, 28-29 (noting the furor that was created when NASA files including sensitive information regarding the space shuttle were threatened to be disclosed to Japan through
FOIA); Wald, supra note 3, at 665-66 (noting that four out of every five FOIA requests
are made by "business executives or their lawyers, who astutely discerned the business
value of the information which government obtains from industry while performing its
licensing, inspecting, regulating, and contracting functions"); id. at 672-73 (discussing various instances of CIA searches for information with little to no public use, including
$325,000 spent on one FOIA requestor, Philip Agee, who wanted all records mentioning
his name).
5. FOIA explicitly exempts from disclosure materials that are
(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order
to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B)
are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of
this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld
from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B)
establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of
matters to be withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial, or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

19951

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FOIA

1185

disclosure is not invoked by the responding agency, the request is

processed. Without assessing either the need or the merit of the
request, the system accommodates the inquiry free of charge, devoting significant attention to each demand and accruing extraordinary expense and delay.6 The expenditure of time and money is
all the more impressive in light of the relatively few FOIA requests that are actually processed in full, particularly in areas such
as CIA files. By claiming that even meritorious disclosures could
unwittingly compromise sensitive intelligence information, the CIA
nearly always succeeds in withholding data under the claimed

exemption.7 Thus, with this near-blanket protection from compelled disclosure, the Agency is effectively removed from the
ambit of FOIA's authority.
The consequence of this judicially created, or at minimum
judicially sanctioned, removal of CIA information from the Act's

(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information
(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings,
(B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a
confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or
any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and,
in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement
authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a
lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a
confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be
expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected
to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning
wells.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988).
6. See generally Michael M. Lowe, Note, The Freedom of Information Act in
1993-1994, 43 DUKE LJ. 1282, 1282-86 (1994) (discussing the enormous costs in time
and money of FOIA administration).
7. Judge Wald cites a 1981 Senate hearing in which CIA Director William Casey
testified that no classified information had been compelled from the Agency over its
objections during the first 15 years of FOIA's existence, 1966-1981. Wald, supra note 3,
at 672. The Deputy Director of the National Security Administration (NSA), Ann
Caracristi, stated at the same proceeding that although the NSA had never had disclosure
effected, the affidavits prepared in response to litigation challenging its claimed exemption
as well as the in camera inspections and admissions were actually even more revealing of
intelligence data than the requested information itself. Id. at 672 n.99.
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scope is that, as far as the CIA is concerned, the purpose of
FOIA is thwarted. If, as under Madison's analysis, the public
needs access to information at the heart of its government's dealings, then CIA documents are a prime example of information
that is essential to a genuine understanding of the workings of the
government yet is otherwise completely concealed from popular
knowledge. But it is precisely this knowledge that is precluded
from discovery by the near complete exemption for the CIA. Although the Agency's secrecy needs are compelling in some circumstances, the balancing of those needs against the public's need for
access is skewed by the virtual exclusion of public interests from
the analysis.8 Because the exemption is nearly absolute, it has become impossible to verify the Agency's need for secrecy in individual cases; instead, extreme judicial deference to CIA conclusions
of exemption has suppressed almost all data, whether or not its
disclosure poses legitimate national security dangers.
In contrast, FOIA jurisprudence in the area of trade secrets
and confidential commercial information obtained by governmental
agencies permits much freer access than in the CIA/national security arena, although the popular need for the information is significantly less pressing in the commercial and financial context. The
near-blanket exemption for the CIA distorts FOIA's underlying
purpose, as does the co-opting of the Act's mechanism for access
by businesses seeking competitor trade secrets. Echoing Madison's
sentiment above, Alexander Hamilton wrote that an informed electorate must "stand ready to sound the alarm when necessary, and
to point out the actors in any pernicious project."9 With this underlying philosophy, FOIA's mechanism is clearly being abused by
executives who use it as an industrial surveillance tool.
The financial and commercial information covered by FOIA
Exemption 4-whether obtained by the government, by voluntary

8. Because of the sophistication of intelligence procedure, an appropriate assessment
of the sensitivity of requested material may be beyond the limits of lay interpretation.
Moreover, although the people "mean to be their own Governors," see supra text accompanying note 3, there is clearly a limit to the extent to which every citizen is permitted
to review all governmental activities. The secrecy required by foreign intelligence is a
very pressing need, quite apart from the popular source of the government's power.
FOIA's design demands accommodation of these secrecy concerns as well as the public's
need for access in its delicate balancing of interests. A blanket exemption for the CIA
inherently distorts that balance.
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 266 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 3d
ed. 1966).
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submission, or as part of a formal investigation-is not the stuff
that comprises the heart of democratic self-rule. Information contained within these records ranges from scientific data about compliance with environmental regulations to corporate financial statements relating to securities issues. Whereas a requestor of CIA
documents gets a peek into important matters of national security
and foreign relations, the "public" in the trade secret context is
viewing the internal operations of private industry, not the government. Thus, the different class of requestors in the Exemption 4
context signals an attenuation of the link between the information
sought and the process of informing the electorate; it is a very
specific public whose needs are being served. This attenuation is
further manifested in the reasons that the information is held by
the government in the FOIA Exemption 4 context as compared
with the CIA area. CIA documents are actually related to internal
government activities, whereas the Exemption 4 information is private commercial information that happens to be contained within
governmental files.
The distinctly private nature of confidential commercial information must be considered in FOIA analysis. The information held
by the CIA was created by the Agency itself as part of its role as
an executive agency safeguarding national security, doubtless one
of the central roles of government.' Documents containing commercial and financial information are produced by businesses for
their own purposes and shared voluntarily or otherwise with a regulatory agency. For example, when a major computer company is
reviewed to determine its compliance with antitrust laws, the financial and commercial materials culled by the government in its investigation have little relevance to the process of democracy and
an informed electorate; rather, they have great pertinence to the
interests of competitor corporations. The distinct purposes served
by the two exemptions compel a different balancing of interests. In
the CIA context, the public need for access strongly supports disclosure of this important governmental information, yet the countervailing secrecy interests of the Agency demand protection of the
documents in cases of genuine threats to national security. In the
confidential commercial information context, the public need for
access is lessened when the information does not shed light on

10. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320-21 (1936).
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internal governmental processes and the privacy interests of the
suppliers strongly support protection of the sensitive information.
Despite this distinction, however, courts have failed to properly
balance the competing interests. Trade secrets have been afforded
considerably less protection by recent courts than CIA files, although the public need for the CIA information is far more pressing. Instead of the clear but conceptually misguided blanket exemption for the CIA, FOIA Exemption 4 law is a morass of tortured reasoning and unsettling results.
This Note addresses recent developments in FOIA law at the
circuit court level in both of these contexts, highlighting trends in
the law as well as potential pitfalls. Throughout this survey, this
Note evaluates the judiciary's success in achieving FOIA's precarious balance between the privacy needs of the government and its
suppliers of information and the citizens' need for access. This
Note concludes that the judiciary has perhaps inadvertently thwarted the purposes behind FOIA's enactment in attempting to
achieve this balance in these areas. Part I of this Note analyzes
three cases involving CIA claims of exemption from FOIA disclosure: Hunt v. CA,1 Maynard v. CA, 2 and Sullivan v. CMA. 3
It argues that the courts' reasoning in this area fails to fully consider FOIA's central purpose in its balancing of interests and acquiesces too quickly to the Agency's near-conclusive assertions of
exemption. Part II discusses three decisions in which confidential
commercial information is at issue in an Exemption 4 dispute:
Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,14
A. Michaels Piano, Inc. v. FTC," and GC Micro Corp. v. Defense
Logistics Agency. 6 This Part argues that FOIA jurisprudence in
the trade secrets area also misconceives the central purpose behind
the Act by being too permissive of disclosure of private commercial information. Lastly, Part III offers suggestions to remedy these
criticisms of the recent case rationales, proposing greater consideration of the fundamental purpose of FOIA in the careful balancing
of interests demanded by these cases.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

981 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1992).
986 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1993).
992 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1993).
975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1579 (1993).
18 F.3d 138 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994).
33 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1994).
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I. THE CIA AND NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
The courts' treatment of CIA claims of exemption from

FOIA's disclosure mandate exemplifies the recent trend of departure from the fundamental purpose of FOIA in balancing the
relative interests and needs for the information. By failing to engage in meaningful judicial review and instead deferring almost
completely to the Agency's conclusions, courts have been unable
to effectuate FOIA's considered balancing of interests. In Part III,
this Note suggests a new component to the existing judicial standards that would unify analysis of CIA cases with FOIA's principled design.
A. Background of CLA Use and Abuse of FOIA Exemptions
One of the areas in which the problems of recent FOIA jurisprudence are most prevalent is the treatment of proper access to
the CIA's classified documents. Congress has acted in some ways
to create new exemptions from disclosure for the CIA,17 but the
FOIA framework still controls the analysis. Persons intending to
use FOIA as a means of access to information held by the CIA
face a unique set of procedures with which they must comply before disclosure is possible. Moreover, because of the extraordinary
level of judicial deference to agency determinations in the CIA
context, the Agency has numerous ways to avoid disclosing its
information even after the procedural requirements are satisfied.
As with any FOIA request, a potential plaintiff must exhaust
all administrative appeals of a denial of disclosure before appealing to a district court."8 Review by the district court is conducted
de novo in CIA cases as well as all other FOIA disputes.'9 As an
initial matter, the CIA determines whether it must disclose even
the existence or non-existence of responsive documents. If the
Agency determines that such an acknowledgment would itself jeopardize national security, then it may choose to issue a so-called
Glomar response, a refusal to confirm or deny the existence or
17. See, e.g., CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431 (1988); National Security Act, 50
U.S.C. § 403(g) (1988) (establishing additional criteria that must be satisfied before disclosure will be mandated under FOIA and further buttressing the Agency's grounds for
withholding the information).
18. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988) (limiting judicial review generally to final agency actions);
id. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988) (describing procedure for appeal to district court).
19. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988).
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non-existence of the requested information.' The requestor could
then challenge the propriety of the Glomar response.
If the CIA determined that it could disclose the existence of
records but refuse to share their substantive content, the district
court proceeding would commence with the Agency's submission
of Vaughn affidavits describing the requested records and explaining why the claimed exemptions apply." These affidavits must set
forth with reasonable precision the reasons for exemption as well
as the specific statutory grounds for nondisclosure.' Under this
sequence, nondisclosure is appropriate when the claimed exemption logically applies and the court determines that the Agency is
acting in good faith in arguing for exemption from FOIA's mandates.' In Ray v. Turner,24 the court noted the distinctive aspects of de novo review in matters involving national security interests, including the substantial weight to be accorded to CIA
affidavits regarding the classified status of the documents in question and the discretion of the court to conduct an in camera review of the disputed information.
The ease with which courts weigh the competing interests of a
FOIA requestor and the Agency and the near-uniformity of results
upholding the CIA's claim of exemption suggest that the application of this procedure by the courts has in recent cases become
unsatisfactory.' The procedural requirements are being used as a
substitute for courts' judgments on the merits, and the Agency
rather than the judiciary is left wielding ultimate decisionmaking
20. Such an answer was first accepted by the court in Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d
1009, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1976), in which the request concerned a ship called the Hughes
Glomar Explorer.
21. The name for these affidavits is derived from Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820,
826-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cerL denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974) (finding conclusory affidavits
were insufficient and remanding to agency for more specific justifications of claims to
exemptions).
22. Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d 1287, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d
1187, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
23. Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
24. 587 F.2d at 1187.
25. ld. at 1194.
26. For a concurrence that this trend is inappropriate, see Danae J. Aitchison, Comment, Reining in the Glomar Response: Reducing CIA Abuse of the Freedom of Information Act, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 219, 246-52 (1993) (arguing that Agency misuse of
Glomar responses necessitates new FOIA amendments). See also Gregory G. Brooker,
Note, FOLA Exemption 3 and the CIA: An Approach to End the Confusion and Controversy, 68 MN. L. REv. 1231, 1260-61 (1984) (proposing an amendment to FOIA that
would force courts to be less deferential to CIA decisions).
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authority over the possibility of disclosure. Similarly, courts have
been quick to defer to fairly broad agency justifications for withholding information, thus weakening the judiciary's ability to require the Agency to remain accountable to public scrutiny through
FOIA. The most unsettling element of this trend is the piecemeal
fashion by which this near-blanket exemption from disclosure has
been created. The purpose of FOIA's access mechanisms has been
slowly and subtly marginalized, and now without public notice,
FOIA no longer applies in any meaningful way to information
held by the CIA.
B. Recent Developments Creating a Near-Blanket FOIA Exemption for the CIA
One of the more candid acknowledgments of this judicial
failure to effectuate FOIA's fundamental purpose came in Hunt v.
CIA.' The Hunt court upheld the CIA's refusal to confirm the
existence of requested records while conceding that such a result
not only creates a near-blanket exemption for the Agency but also
may directly contravene congressional intent.' The plaintiff, who
was then on trial for murder, made a FOIA request to the CIA
for information regarding his alleged victim. The requested information included records showing a relationship between the victim,
an Iranian national, and the CIA; records detailing the victim's
involvement with the U.S. Embassy and activities such as "efforts
to effect a change in government in Iran after Khomeini came to
power," drug trafficking, and blackmail; and copies of all correspondence and records of meetings involving the decedent.29 The
CIA responded to this sweeping request by issuing a Glomar response, refusing to confirm or deny the existence of such records.3" Specifically, the CIA cited the national security protections afforded by FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3 as the statutory
grounds for its refusal.3 The district court found for the request-

27. 981 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1992).
28. Id. at 1120.
29. Id. at 1117.
30. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
31. Hunt, 981 F.2d at 1117. Although FOIA Exemption 1 specifically authorizes nondisclosure of records containing information relevant to national security, see supra note
5, many CIA context cases arise under Exemption 3, the general exemption including any
additional nondisclosure authorized by statute. Id.
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or, concluding that withholding under Exemption 1 was improper
when the agency's affidavits "failed to articulate a specific harm
stemming from disclosure."'3 Moreover, the district court concluded that under the CIA Information Act, the CIA "can refuse
to confirm or deny the existence of records only when the information would relate to covert actions."'33 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, reversed and emphasized the
CIA's virtually complete exemption from disclosure of information
under FOIA.'
Sidestepping the Exemption 1 question, the court held that
exemption from disclosure was warranted under FOIA Exemption
3 and the National Security Act.' The National Security Act confers responsibility on the CIA Director "for protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."36 In addition,
the CIA Information Act completely excludes most operational
files from FOIA disclosure.37 The Hunt court echoed the Supreme Court's reasoning in CIA v. Sims, 38 emphasizing in particular the broad scope of the CIA's ability to withhold information
under Exemption 3. The fact that the court confined its analysis to
examining the additional statutory bases for exemption from disclosure rather than addressing FOIA's explicit exemption of national security information under Exemption 1 shows the degree to
which the CIA is no longer a real participant in the FOIA
scheme. Both judicial reluctance to adjudicate intelligence matters
and congressional willingness to create numerous ways for the CIA
to avoid disclosing its material have combined to effect a nearblanket exemption for the Agency. Furthermore, by interpreting
the issue within the structure of Exemption 3, the catchall exemption that includes the additional, post-FOIA grounds for nondisclosure, the court shifts all responsibility for the CIA's exemption
onto Congress. While congressional acquiescence in legislating
additional CIA loopholes is responsible for much of the public's
inability to access CIA information, the courts also are to blame
when they opt to evade the tough questions posed by the statutory

32.
33.
34.
35.

Hunt, 981 F.2d at 1117-18.
Id. at 1118.
Id. at 1120.
Id. at 1118; 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1988).

36. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3).
37. Id. § 431.
38. 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
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language in Exemption 1 and instead throw up their hands at what
they claim to be Congress's work. When the balancing of interests
is skewed by exclusion of the public's need for access from the
analysis, the policy behind FOIA is ignored.
The Hunt court skewed the balance in this way by reasoning
that, because the Agency keeps records on foreign nationals who
are either CIA sources or targets as well as on foreign intelligence
operatives, acknowledging existence or absence of such records
could reveal or compromise sources and methods.39 This reasoning would be acceptable if the court had engaged in substantive
review of the Agency's determinations and had concluded that
national security and intelligence interests genuinely required withholding the information. Such substantive review would require
greater factual specificity in affidavits and articulation of specific
harm from disclosure, as well as involving more extensive scrutiny
in in camera review. The reasoning hints at circularity, however,
when the court allows the Agency's affidavits to prove themselves
in conclusory language and suggests that all records are subsumed
in an exemption for documents that reveal details of intelligence
operations simply because the CIA is engaged in intelligence operations and keeps pertinent records.O In defense of this assumed
conclusion, the court explained that "the disclosure of the existence or non-existence of documents must not be viewed in isolation but rather as one tile in a mosaic of intelligence gathering."4'
Thus, when looking at the wider pattern of intelligence operations
from which individual records are taken, "experts could then determine the contours and gaps of CIA intelligence operations and
make informed judgments as to the identities of probable sources
and targets."42 Although this "pieces of the puzzle" danger may
be compelling in certain cases, the Hunt court claimed judicial
ignorance without engaging in meaningful review. It merely deferred to the CIA's uncontroverted assertions of danger and lack
of judicial expertise to assess risk of disclosure. These claims by

39. Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1992).
40. Id. The court permitted the Agency to assume its own conclusion: "According to
CIA affidavits, barring a Glomar response, CIA intelligence gathering would be impaired
by its own disclosures in response to FOIA requests." Id. Thus, the CIA argued from
consequences without first proving with specific evidence that disclosure was inappropriate.
41. Id. at 1119.
42. Id.
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the Agency are impossible to refute because the underlying information is solely within the CIA's control and clearly beyond the
court's desire to adjudicate.
Beyond simply the danger of revealing information, however,
the Ninth Circuit offered additional rationales for withholding such
information. From a CIA policy perspective, disclosure of such
information regarding sources and methods of intelligence could
have more subtle and far-reaching consequences. The court accepted the Agency's position that, after disclosure, "potential future
sources would be reluctant to come forward; targets of intelligence
scrutiny would be alerted and could take additional precautions;
and foreign operatives could learn whether or not the CIA was
aware of their activities." 43 Because the court concluded that "disclosure of the existence or non-existence of records pertaining to
[the victim] is tantamount to a disclosure whether or not he was a
CIA source or intelligence target,"'' the court did not require the
Agency to make an additional showing of a "high degree of damage to CIA intelligence gathering. ' Thus, the court acquiesced
to the CIA's insistence that "any such interest, if made public,
may create the danger that sources and methods of intelligence
gathering will be compromised." This scintilla of danger rule
obviates the need for proof in individual cases of heightened risk
inherent in disclosure.
Significantly, the Hunt court not only exempted the Agency
from complying with the FOIA request but also permitted the
Agency to avoid giving a concrete answer as to the existence of
responsive documents. Thus, the court held that "the CIA's affidavits explain the Agency's conclusion that a Glomar response is
required to protect intelligence sources and methods. In light of
the Director's extensive power to protect these sources and methods, we conclude that Hunt's request is exempt from FOIA."'4 7
The court then acknowledged the far-reaching ramifications of its
holding in terms of the CIA's relation to the FOIA doctrine and
structure. The court explained that "with this decision, we are now
'only a short step [from] exempting all CIA records' from

43.
44.

Id.
Id.

45. Id. at 1120.
46. Id.

47. Id.
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FOIA."' The court recognized the profound disjuncture between
this virtually per se exemption and the spirit of FOIA: "That result
may well be contrary to what Congress intended."'49 This concession is an extraordinary comment on the current state of FOIA jurisprudence and also demonstrates the departure by the court from
the fundamental purpose of the Act. After such an admission that
the result may directly controvert Congress's design for FOIA, it is
unclear how the court could believe that it was nonetheless justified in its conclusion. Citing a now-anachronistic statement in legislative history, the court posited what was once touted to be the
success of FOIA as the breakdown in current FOIA jurisprudence.
The court quoted a 1984 congressional report stating "that FOIA
'has played a vital part in maintaining the American people's faith
in their government, and particularly in agencies like the CIA."' 50
Further stressing the irony of this assertion, the court explained
that "[w]hether or not that was actually the case at one time, it
certainly is not true now, at least insofar as the CIA is concerned."'51
According to the Hunt court, the only available recourse to
this evolution of CIA-FOIA jurisprudence is congressional action:
"If Congress did not intend to give the CIA a near-blanket FOIA
exemption, it can take notice of the court's incremental creation of
one, and take the necessary legislative action to rectify the matter."'52 Here the court recognized that not only is it being extremely permissive of the Agency's determinations but also such
permissiveness directly contravenes congressional intent. By responding to this inconsistency with FOIA's central purpose with a
suggestion that it is Congress's obligation to return FOIA jurisprudence to its textual limits, the court is completely abdicating its
proper judicial role.
After Hunt, other courts articulated similar reasoning in their
refusal to compel the CIA to produce documents over its objections. In Maynard v. CA,53 the First Circuit upheld the CIA's

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 726, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741, 3747).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 986 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1993).
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claims for exemption of the requested information,: emphasizing
its reluctance to question the Agency's own conclusions and to
engage in rigorous balancing of the interests.5 In Maynard, the
FOIA requestor was the former wife of a man who disappeared
on a flight over Cuba in 1961 while allegedly distributing antiCastro leaflets. The CIA invoked FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3 as its
basis for refusing the request. 6 The district court rejected the
agency affidavits, stating instead that the "assertion that disclosure
will 'reveal its sources and methods' in a matter now approximately thirty years old is without substance and is, indeed, the height
of bureaucratic disingenuousness." 57 On appeal, the circuit court
reversed, holding that the information was exempt from disclosure
because "it is at very least 'arguable' that the requested paragraph
falls within [the National Security Act] for the reason
the CIA
58
gave, to wit, that it could reveal intelligence methods."
In its opinion, however, the court did little to elucidate the
reasons why such an unsupported assertion was acceptable. More
importantly, the opinion failed to address the district court's arguments raised in its attack on the Agency for continually stonewalling attempts by citizens to gain access to its information. The
court simply deferred to the Agency's affidavits, explaining that
"judges 'have little or no background in the delicate business of
intelligence gathering' and may be unable to comprehend the
significance of material that appears to be innocuous, but in fact
can reveal a significant intelligence source or method." 59 Allowing
the Agency's affidavits to bootstrap themselves into exemption and
to prove their own arguments highlights the dilemma at the heart
of CIA-FOIA jurisprudence. Because the Agency has total authority over the documents in question and because non-agency reviewers cannot and will not properly assess the potential problems
caused by disclosure, the courts are forced to acquiesce to the
CIA position. The extreme deference demonstrated by the court is
tantamount to sanctioning the Agency's own conclusion in every
case; the authors of FOIA certainly had a more meaningful mechanism of review in mind when they designed a framework includ54. Id. at 555.
55. Id. at 555 n.6.
56. ld. at 552.
57. Id. at 554.
58. Id. at 555.
59. Id. at 554-55 (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)).
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ing de novo review. This difficulty is exemplified by the Maynard
court's rejection of the district court's finding that the advanced
age of the information supported its disclosure. On appeal, the
court stressed its reluctance to articulate a time-specific rule because "it is virtually impossible for an outsider to ascertain what
effect the passage of time may or may not have had to mitigate
the harm from disclosure of sources and methods."' Indeed, the
court posited a broader view of the time period significant to
intelligence operations, looking at thirty years not as a long time
but rather as "well within the careers of living persons including
government leaders (like Cuba's leader) still in power."'61 Rather
than addressing the difficult task of balancing the relative interests,
the court simply deferred to the Agency's determinations: "The
CIA, not the judiciary, is better able to weigh the risks that disclosure of such information may reveal intelligence sources and methods so as to endanger national security."'62
Although concluding that its analysis under Exemption 3 resolved the issue, the Maynard court also discussed the CIA's argument for nondisclosure under Exemption 1.63 The court stressed
the high level of deference accorded to the Agency's affidavits as
long as the searches were adequately performed and there was no
evidence of bad faith by the CIA.' Because the information
"'arguably' or 'logically' pertained to intelligence methods," it
could be withheld under FOIA Exemption 1.65 The court emphasized its unease in reviewing the matter: "We are not in a position
to 'second-guess' the CIA's conclusion66 regarding the need for
continued classification of this material.,

60. Id. at 555 n.6.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.at 555-56. For a discussion of the procedures required in CIA cases arising
under FOIA, see supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text. The distinction between analysis under Exemptions 1 and 3 is as follows: under Exemption 1, the Agency must show
that it is protecting records "in the interest of national defense or foreign policy"; Exemption 3 allows additional enabling statutes to confer broader discretion on the Agency
and to sanction nondisclosure. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1988) (authorizing the
CIA director to protect "intelligence sources and methods"); see also supra text accompanying notes 31-38.
64. Maynard, 986 F.2d at 555-56.
65. Id.at 556.
66. Id. at 556 n.9.
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Significantly, the Maynard court concluded that there was no
public interest in access to the material in question. In the absence
of any public need for access, therefore, the secrecy interests of
the Agency supported nondisclosure.67 In support of its reasoning,
the court cited the Supreme Court in Department of Justice v.
Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press, stating that "the
only cognizable 'public interest' for purposes of FOIA is 'the
citizens' right to be informed about 'what their government is up
to.' " According to the Maynard court, when the information
sought is purely about private citizens and not more generally
illustrative of governmental actions and procedures, "[t]hat purpose ... is not fostered by disclosure of information about private

citizens that is accumulated in various governmental files but that
reveals little or nothing about an agency's own conduct."'69 By
defining the popular right to knowledge narrowly, the Maynard
court was able to conclude that interaction between a government
agency and an individual citizen lies beyond the scope of the
needs of an informed electorate. Thus, the balancing of interests
was again skewed against accommodation of public need for access
and in favor of a near-blanket exemption for the CIA.
Later in 1993, the First Circuit revisited the FOIA issue in
circumstances also involving CIA anti-Castro operations. Once
again it acquiesced to the Agency's insistence on nondisclosure by
demanding a high degree of specificity in the FOIA request. In
Sullivan v. CIA,7 the court upheld the Agency's reliance on the
CIA Information Act of 19847' and rejected a FOIA request
made by the daughter of a man who disappeared while allegedly
participating "in a CIA-sponsored mission to drop propaganda (or
perhaps something more sinister) over Cuba."'72 In discussing the
history and structure of FOIA, the court emphasized the cost-benefit problems inherent in a CIA response to a FOIA request and
the difficulty experienced by outsiders in accurately assessing the
risk associated with disclosure of intelligence data. The court referred to "the arcane realm of the CIA," suggesting its discomfort

67. Id. at 566 (citing FLRA v. Dep't of Navy, 941 F.2d 49, 57 (1st Cir. 1991).
68. Id. (quoting Department of Justice v. Reporters' Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)).
69. Id.
70. 992 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1993).
71. 50 U.S.C. § 431 (1988).
72. Sullivan, 992 F.2d at 1251.
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at passing judgment in an area of such little judicial or other accessible expertise.73
The Sullivan court began its analysis with a subtle criticism of

the broad exemptions existing within FOIA, hinting at the benefits
of a blanket CIA exemption from the Act. The court explained:
FOIA does not give the CIA carte blanche to refrain from producing documents merely because it is an intelligence agency.
Consequently, the CIA had to divert trained intelligence officers
to search its entire file system in response to FOIA requests,
notwithstanding the relatively limited number of non-exempt
documents likely to be culled. 74

In light of these "inefficiencies," the court explained that Congress
had enacted the CIA Information Act to create additional FOIA
exemptions The effect of the CIA Information Act was to eliminate the need for the Agency to search its operational files in
most instances. Again, however, Congress provided a mechanism
for the disclosure of "highly informative" information by creating
certain exceptions within the CIA Information Act. 7 6 These exceptions included disclosure of "first-party requests, special activity
requests, and requests that focus on investigations of improprieties
73. Id. at 1256.
74. Id.
75. Id. The CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431 (1988), provides in relevant part:
(a) Operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency may be exempted by
the Director of Central Intelligence from the provisions of section 552 of title 5
(Freedom of Information Act) which require publication or disclosure, or search
or review in connection therewith.
(f) Whenever any person who has requested agency records under section 552
of title 5 (Freedom of Information Act), alleges that the Central Intelligence
Agency has improperly withheld records because of failure to comply with any
provision of this section, judicial review shall be available under the terms set
forth in section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, except that- ....
(4)(A) when a complainant alleges that requested records were improperly
withheld because of improper exemption of operational files, the Central
Intelligence Agency shall meet its burden under section 552(a)(4)(B) of
title 5 by demonstrating to the court by sworn written submission that
exempted operational files likely to contain responsive records currently
perform the functions set forth in subsection (b) of this section [the definition of operational files]; and
(B) the court may not order the Central Intelligence Agency to review
the content of any exempted operational file or files in order to make
the demonstration required under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph,
unless the complainant disputes the Central Intelligence Agency's showing
with a sworn written submission based on personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence.
76. Sullivan, 992 F.2d at 1251.
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in intelligence-gathering activities."' The Sullivan court construed
these exceptions strictly, concluding that nondisclosure was appropriate under the circumstances.78
In its analysis, the court emphasized two basic concerns under79
pinning the CIA's claim for exemption: specificity and secrecy.
In order to satisfy the specificity concern of the special activity
exception, the burden is on the FOIA requestor to "identify a
particular CIA activity in connection with his or her request."'
The court cited legislative history as support for its construction of
the term "special activity" as "any activity of the United States
Government, other than an activity intended solely for obtaining
necessary intelligence, which is planned and executed so that the
role of the United States is not apparent or acknowledged publicly."' 81 This definition as applied to FOIA requests is paradoxical
because it requires such specificity from a FOIA requestor who
wants information about an operation that is by definition secret.
As guidelines for its specificity requirement, the First Circuit
listed both sufficiently and insufficiently specific examples of requests that appeared in legislative history and caselaw and compared them with the Sullivan circumstances. In these examples,
according to the court, requests relating to the Bay of Pigs invasion or the coup d'etat in Guatemala in the 1950s would meet the
requisite thresh6ld of specificity, whereas a request for information
regarding the existence of covert efforts to counter Soviet intelligence in Western Europe during the 1950s would not be sufficiently precise.' In light of these examples, the court concluded that
the Sullivan request was "too expansively described to slip within
the integument of" the "special activity" exception.' The court's
justification for this conclusion included the length of time of the
CIA's campaign against Castro, the breadth of the operations, and
the numerous parties involved.' Because of the sweeping impact

77. Id. at 1252.
78. Id. at 1253-56.
79. Id. at 1253.
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 726, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3766).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1254.
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of CIA involvement in an anti-Castro movement, the court held
that the request was not detailed enough in its demands.
If the court had viewed the request in light of FOIA's overriding purpose and adequately accounted for the public interests, it
seems difficult to imagine a case in which information would be
more important to the public and to a requestor whose next of kin
may have died in the efforts. The very reasons that the court gave
in support of its conclusion undercut its analysis; it is precisely
because of the enormous length and scope of the Agency's involvement in an anti-Castro campaign that the information is so
relevant. Moreover, there is no elucidation in the court's opinion
or in the arguments acknowledged of the present danger of releasing such information. Indeed, such vastly important information to
the American public gains even more interest if its value is historical in nature and if disclosure will not prejudice any current operations.
After discussing the lack of specificity in the Sullivan request,
the court concluded that the demand for information also failed
under the secrecy aspect of the "special activity" exception.' The
court explained that although the CIA had acknowledged involvement in an operation and even responded to congressional investigations regarding the incidents, the FOIA requestor in this case
did not merit access to the underlying information.' While the
court's arguments that the request was simply too remote in relation to the investigations are sustainable, the court failed to recognize potential problems with its analysis. When the Agency admits
its involvement and when legislative action has been taken to
inquire into a matter, to allow the CIA to retain complete control
over the information at issue is to remove it from the scope of
FOIA in its entirety. The Agency retains all the power in this
situation, and by keeping the documents classified with the courts'
acquiescence and implied approval, the FOIA requestor is doomed
to fail. Even with congressional action to support an inquiry, the
individual requestor cannot succeed. Without more information,
the request cannot be made more specific without Agency cooperation, and the information can stay secret nearly indefinitely.
Echoing the Hunt and Maynard courts' abdication of judicial
responsibility, the court emphasized that "Congress crafted the
85. Id.
86. Id.
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CIA Information Act to strike a balance between public disclosure
and an effective intelligence apparatus. Our role is not to reassess
the relative interests ...

or to yield whenever human sympathies

are engaged, but simply to apply the law as Congress wrote it."'
Though Congress may indeed share in the blame for the failure of
FOIA to strike a workable balance, the courts in Hunt, Maynard,
and Sullivan are equally responsible for the near complete exemption of intelligence materials from FOIA's calculus to achieve
public access to governmental materials. By failing to engage in a
meaningful review of the substantive claims, the courts neglected
to adequately consider both countervailing interests in the balance.
II. EXEMPTION 4: CONFIDENTIAL COMMERCIAL INFORMATION
In assessing the propriety of FOIA disclosure of confidential
commercial information, courts have failed to consider the guiding
purpose of the Act in their analysis. Without questioning the applicability of the fundamental purposes of FOIA to a particular
situation, courts cannot adequately strike a balance between the
public's need for access to governmental information and the
suppliers' needs for privacy. In Part III, this Note suggests factors
to be considered in a more meaningful judicial review of this delicate balance.
A. Background of the Use and Abuse of FOIA Exemption 4
FOIA's Exemption 4 permits refusing a request for trade
secrets or private, confidential information of a commercial or
financial nature that is held by the government.' The records at
issue under this exemption are conceptually distinct from those of
the CIA discussed above as they are prepared by private individuals or organizations in the course of business and are being held
by the government for various administrative purposes. Thus, such
information is not itself reflective of governmental processes, but
instead may be highly illuminative of a corporation's internal financial structure and commercial viability. The courts have been
sensitive to the distinctive nature of this information and have
attempted to craft modes of analysis that protect the confidentiality of the information. 9
87. Id. at 1256.
88. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1988); see supra note 5.
89. See, e.g., National Parks & Constr. Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir.
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Specifically, courts have distinguished between information
voluntarily submitted to the government and documents obtained
by subpoena or other involuntary means.' Voluntarily submitted
information provides the least amount of insight into governmental
activities because unlike subpoenaed information it is not usually
obtained within the course of an active government investigation.
Thus, voluntarily submitted information is the least probative in
the citizens' quest to inform themselves about governmental affairs. This mode of analysis was articulated in the National Parks
test, which defined as confidential and exempt under Exemption 4
aniy commercial or financial information that, if disclosed, would
be likely "(1) to impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to
the competitive position of the person from whom the information
was obtained."'" This test continues to guide Exemption 4 analysis today, although the results it produces are occasionally
schizophrenic and often contravene of the purposes behind FOIA's
enactment and design.
B. Recent Developments Creating a Conflicting and Unprincipled
Exemption 4 Jurisprudence
Whereas the courts have been too lenient in their acquiescence to CIA objections to compelled FOIA disclosure, Exemption
4 analysis involving confidential commercial or financial information has produced more varied results under highly conflicting
rationales. In late 1992, the D.C. Circuit attempted to clarify the
test appropriate for Exemption 4 FOIA cases. In Critical Mass
Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2 the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, protected private commercial information
from disclosure under FOIA 93 and, in so doing, further complicated Exemption 4 jurisprudence. The court reconsidered the long-

1974), discussed infra text accompanying note 91; Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Critical Mass III), discussed

infra text accompanying notes 92-120; A. Michael's Piano v. FTC, 18 F.3d 138 (2d Cir),
cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1579 (1994), discussed infra text accompanying notes 121-44.
90. See National Parks, 498 F.2d at 765, discussed infra text accompanying note 91.
91. National Parks, 498 F.2d at 770 (citations omitted).
92. '975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc). As discussed infra note 102 and accompanying text, the present decision is actually the third holding in a series of conflicting
results; thus, this case is properly referred to as Critical Mass Ilf.

93.

Id.at 880.
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standing National Parks9' test and concluded that the test was
still valid as applied to information provided to the government
involuntarily. The court then articulated a new test for voluntarily
submitted data, treating it as confidential for Exemption 4 purposes "if it is of a kind that the provider would not customarily make
available to the public."'95
The court articulated two interests that are at stake in Exemption 4 cases. First, the government has an interest in ensuring the
continued availability of confidential commercial information so
that administrative agencies may conduct reviews in a substantive
manner. Second, the private individual or corporation has an interest in protecting the privacy of its information and the continued
viability of its economic position from FOIA-sanctioned industrial
espionage. 96 Thus, the voluntariness of the submission of the information to the government is essential to an analysis under
Exemption 4 that is in harmony with FOIA's overall framework
and purpose. In National Parks, the information was provided
under compulsion, and the court's holding in that case was based
specifically on the fact that there was no danger that public disclosure would harm the government's ability to obtain similar information in the future. 97
The court in CriticalMass III, however, distinguished between
mandatory submission of information in National Parks and the
voluntary submission at issue here.9" In Critical Mass III, the requested information included safety reports regarding the construction and operation of nuclear power plants and facilities compiled
by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations, whose members
include management of all American nuclear power plants. 9 The
reports were made available voluntarily to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) on the "explicit understanding that they are
not to be disclosed to additional persons without [the Institute's]
consent."'" Voluntariness pervaded the data collection and distribution process. The Institute was a nonprofit organization formed

94. See supra text accompanying note 91.
95.

CriticalMass III, 975 F.2d at 872.

96. Id. at 873 (quoting National Parks & Constr. Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770
(D.C. Cir. 1974)).
97. National Parks, 498 F.2d at 770.
98. CriticalMass III, 975 F.2d at 878.
99. Id. at 874.
100. Id.
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after the 1979 Three-Mile Island nuclear accident for the purpose
of promoting safety and reliability in the nuclear power plant
industry. While it was not itself subject to regulation by the NRC,
its members were, and the NRC received the reports in the absence of any duty by the Institute.
The public interest motivation behind the formation of the Institute and its continued work was significant. Because of the 1979
accident, a nonprofit group was formed to act as a semi-external
check on the operations of power plants.1"' Thus, the lofty democratic ideals cited as the basis for FOIA's existence were acted
upon in a private mode in the creation of the Institute; the Institute was the nongovernmental vehicle by which the industry executives performed a quasi-executive role in keeping watch over the
health and safety of citizens. Thus, motivations similar to those
behind FOIA's passage underpinned the Institute's work to the
extent that it was formed voluntarily to protect Americans from
collusive and potentially dangerous behavior by industry, rather
than by government. While the NRC's aegis is limited to investigations and a more policing function, the Institute exists for the
purpose of full and voluntary disclosure of information within the
industry and the government.
After a series of conflicting decisions and two earlier panel
decisions,"

the D.C. Circuit elected to rehear the case en banc.

In Critical Mass III, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the National Parks
test in the interest of stare decisis but limited its applicability to
cases in which the information was compelled by the government.1 t° The court explained the distinction between voluntarily
submitted and compelled information under each of the two interests-governmental and private-underpinning Exemption 4 analy-

101. Id
102. Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 644 F. Supp. 344
(D.D.C. 1986); Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 830 F.2d 278
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Critical Mass 1); Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 731 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1990); Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 931 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Critical Mass If). The procedural background is significant not only in understanding the opinion at hand, but more importantly
as a vivid indication of the jurisprudential morass that Exemption 4 analysis has become.
The sequence of holdings and rationales is also illustrative of the intense difficulty the
courts have had in formulating a workable definition of "confidential" for the purposes of
Exemption 4 construction. In particular, it highlights the pressing need for clarity in this
area, where so much is at stake and so little is predictable.
103.

Critical Mass II1, 975 F.2d at 880.
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sis. As to the governmental interest when information is compelled, the inquiry focuses primarily on the effect public disclosure
has on the quality of the information."° Regarding voluntarily
submitted information, however, the main concern of the government is safeguarding the cooperative relationship between the supplying business entity and the government."°5 According to the
Critical Mass 1HI court, the same distinction between policy objectives in support of withholding the information exists with respect
to the private interest against commercial disadvantage. The innovation of Critical Mass III was the recognition of "a private interest in preserving the confidentiality of information that is provided
to the Government on a voluntary basis," in addition to the traditional acknowledgment of governmental interests in administrative
efficiency and effectiveness." 6 Thus, the court incorporated additional bases for maintaining confidentiality while leaving open the
question of whether even more interests might also support the exemption
of confidential commercial information from FOIA disclo107
sure.
The court then applied the newly expanded Exemption 4
analysis to voluntarily submitted information and concluded that
"financial or commercial information provided to the Government
on a voluntary basis is 'confidential' for the purpose of Exemption
4 if it is of a kind that would customarily not be released to the
public by the person from whom it was obtained. ' ' In support
of this conclusion and the establishment of this additional criterion,
the court referred to the "matter of common sense" dictating that
"the disclosure of information the Government has secured from
voluntary sources on a confidential basis will both jeopardize its
continuing ability to secure such data on a cooperative basis and
injure the provider's interest in preventing its unauthorized re' 9 In the final understanding, then, the court held that
lease. '""
104. Id at 878.
105. The court concluded succinctly, "Thus, when information is obtained under duress, the Government's interest is in ensuring its continued reliability; when that information is volunteered, the Government's interest is in ensuring its continued availability." Id.
106. Id. at 879. The governmental interests in efficiency and efficacy, noted in the
now-overruled Critical Mass I opinion, 830 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1987), were derived by
the First Circuit in 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. Bd. of Governors, 721
F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1983).
107. Critical Mass III, 975 F.2d at 879.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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this further complication of Exemption 4 jurisprudence was justified both by sophisticated statutory intent arguments and by common sense.

Applying this analysis to the Critical Mass I1 facts, the court
held that information contained within the reports was voluntarily
provided commercial information that was not usually released to
the public by the Institute. Thus, the data was confidential under
Exemption 4 and thereby protected from public disclosure under
FOIA."' One of the most troubling consequences of this analysis, however, is the inference suggested by Critical Mass Energy
Project in its argument that government and industry may be
encouraged "to conspire to keep information from the public by
agreeing to the voluntary submission of information that the agency has the power to compel." '' Deeper, however, is the concern
that the understanding of confidentiality is really a contracting
away of disclosure obligations. The Critical Mass III court's response to these suggestions was simply to emphasize that there is
no FOIA requirement "that obliges agencies to exercise their regulatory authority in a manner that will maximize the amount of
information that will be made available to the public" and that the
NRC's discretion regarding modes of obtaining data was beyond
the court's power to second-guess."'
The analysis of the court, while ostensibly founded in statutory language and intent as well as common sense, was not accepted
by all members of the en banc panel. Judge Randolph, joined by
Judges Silberman and Sentelle, concurred in the opinion of the
court somewhat reluctantly, conceding that stare decisis counseled
against flatly overruling National Parks while insisting that proper
analysis of Exemption 4 focused primarily on the language of the
Act itself and not additional judicial criteria."' Four other members of the Circuit, however, dissented from the supposedly clari-

110. Id. at 880.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 882 (Randolph, J., concurring). It is, of course, paradoxical that Judge
Randolph's attack on the National Parks test in his Critical Mass II concurrence, 931
F.2d 939, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Randolph, J., concurring), charged that the test was an
unfounded additional criterion demanded of Exemption 4 analysis, while he apparently
accepted the articulation of a distinction between voluntarily submitted and compelled
information in Critical Mass III, a distinction found nowhere in the language of the exemption itself.
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fied opinion in CriticalMass III. In dissent, Judge Ginsburg, joined
by Chief Judge Mikva and Judges Wald and Edwards, argued that
the principle of stare decisis required full affirmance of the National Parks test and that "the guiding purpose of [FOIA]-to shed
light on an agency's performance of
its statutory duties"-was not
14
reasoning.
majority's
the
by
upheld
The dissent challenged the objectivity of the majority's new
test, noting that without "an independent judicial check on the
reasonableness of the provider's custom [against public disclosure]
and the consonance of that custom with the purposes of exemption
4," the court simply acquiesced to allowing providers "to render
categories of information confidential merely by withholding them
from the public long enough to show a custom."'1 5 Thus, the test
is subjective to the degree that it wrests control from the public
and the judiciary and places it within the total control of the business entity providing the information. The dissent assailed the
majority's test for its disharmony with "Congress' unmistakably
clear direction: 'The mandate of the FOIA calls for broad disclosure of Government records.' ,,16 By dispensing with the requirement of showing how disclosure affects private or governmental
interest as defined by National Parks, the dissent insisted that
Exemption 4 will balloon far beyond congressional intent. Without
a thoughtful balancing of the relative interest, courts will give in to
"the temptation of government and business officials to follow the
path of least resistance and say 'confidential' whenever they seek
117
to satisfy the government's vast information needs.
The dissent also argued against the use of a categorical approach to FOIA analysis without examining the character of the
underlying data. Looking to the facts of Critical Mass, the dissent
insisted that "disclosure is sought 'not primarily in the commercial
interest of the requestor,' but to advance public understanding of
the nature and quality of the NRC's oversight operations or activities." ' The problem with this argument lies in its blindness to
other uses of the information, uses which could be commercially
114.

CriticalMass III, 975 F.2d at 882 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

115. Id. at 883.
116. Id. at 884 (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)).
117. Id. at 885 (quoting 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. Bd. of Governors,
721 F.2d 1, 12 n.5 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
118. Id. (quoting Department of Justice v. Reporters' Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 774, 775 (1988)).
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disastrous to the businesses supplying the information. While the
FOIA requestor in this particular case was a consumer advocacy
group, there was certainly no restriction of access to nonprofit
groups or non-competitors of the information supplier. Moreover,
there is no restriction on the use of the information by the FOIA
requestor once it is received. Thus, whereas this case presents a
FOIA requestor with a publicly beneficial purpose, there is no
objective analytical distinction between this case and the FOIA requestor in another case who might want the information for her
own commercial needs. 1 9 Nonetheless, the dissent echoed its earlier call for a sincere assessment of the interests, insisting that the
majority's holding was tantamount to "the virtual abandonment of
federal court scrutiny" of voluntarily submitted commercial or
financial materials."'
The issue of disclosure of confidential commercial information
was rendered even more complex by the Second Circuit in A.
Michael's Piano, Inc. v. FTC.' The court in A. Michael's Piano
added yet another case-specific test to the Exemption 4 thicket. It
demanded consideration of whether the information was collected
as part of an investigation and whether the agency had the power
to subpoena the records if not voluntarily submitted.'2 After
chastising the district court for erring too far on the side of nondisclosure, the court then proposed yet another test to determine
when commercial information obtained by the government must be
shared with private citizens.Y The FOIA requestor in this case
was a former retail distributor of Steinway pianos who wanted
access to corporate records that Steinway had voluntarily submitted to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on the mutual understanding that they would not be made public. The court acknowledged the strong political rhetoric underpinning FOIA disclosure,
citing as the statute's premise
the Founders' view that "the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter,
under which the several branches of government hold their pow-

119. See, e.g., A. Michael's Piano, Inc. v. FTC, 18 F.3d 138 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115

S.Ct. 1579 (1994); see infra text accompanying notes 121-44.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Critical Mass III, 975 F.2d at 886 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
18 F.3d at 138.
Id. at 145-46.
Id. at 146; see infra text accompanying note 143.
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er, is derived".... [O]ur government, relying as it does on the
consent of the governed, may not succeed unless its "people who
mean to be their own governors... arm themselves with the
power knowledge gives."124
The court attempted to balance this interest against the recognition that "if every document in the possession of a federal agency
was freely available to the press or public, not many documents
would be voluntarily submitted."'2
The records at issue involved Steinway's manufacturing processes and warranty practices. The FTC had investigated allegations that the manufacturer "had failed to honor warranties, particularly those with respect to cracks or other asserted flaws in the
soundboards of its pianos."' 26 As part of the inquiry, the FTC
collected documents from Steinway as well as at from least six of
its competitor corporations. The information requested by the FTC
included "a broad range of documents and information concerning
the manufacturer, its dealers, manufacturing processes, and warranty practices.""Ir The data was obtained from Steinway "voluntarily... [i]n furtherance of [the pending] investigation" and with the
understanding that such data "provided voluntarily in lieu of compulsory process in a law enforcement investigation... [is] exempt
from public disclosure under [FOIA Exemption 3]."'" Thus, the
definition of "voluntary" suggested by this investigation includes an
element of implied threat, as the FTC investigation already had
commenced and compulsory production of information could be
demanded by the agency.
Steinway produced voluntarily "a substantial amount" of information, and the FTC collected information from "a number of
retail piano dealers, technicians, and owners."' 29 All letters and
documents collected by the agency as part of its investigation of
Steinway were sought by the FOIA requestor. Significantly, A.
Michael's Piano had a somewhat strained relationship with Steinway after it refused a new dealership contract written by Steinway
that would have pressured the dealer to adhere to the manufactur-

124. Id. at 140 (citations omitted).
125. Id. at 141.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 142.
128. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 57b-2(f) (1988)).
129. Id.
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er's suggested retail prices for the pianos. 30 After the new contract was rejected, no new Steinway pianos were shipped to the
dealer, which had been the largest single-location Steinway dealer
in the country.'3 '
Thus, it is against this background that A. Michael's Piano
made its request for information. The FTC denied the request,
citing Exemptions 3 and 4 as bases for withholding voluntarily
submitted documents.3 The Second Circuit analyzed the issue
under Exemption 3 and did not address Exemption 4 directly.
Implicit in its discussion of the FTC Act, however, are the
same issues underpinning the trade secret and commercial information exemption.TM The court interpreted the FTC Act directly,
refusing to take a position as to whether withholding statutes
should be construed narrowly or deferentially and choosing instead
to look "to the plain language of the statute and
135 its legislative
purpose."'
legislative
determine
to
order
in
history,
The court rejected the argument that the statute defines "voluntarily" narrowly, explaining that "[t]he statute cannot be read to
turn on whether material submitted voluntarily was so provided
because compulsory process was a 'viable possibility.' ,,9136 The
flaw with this analysis, according to the court, was that "[s]uch a
vague and amorphous formulation would create needless difficulties for the courts that would be obliged to apply it.' 37 The alternative analysis was equally unacceptable to the court, which

130. Id. at 141.
131. Id.
132. Id.at 142.
133. The FTC Act provides in relevant part:
Any material which is received by the Commission in any investigation, a purpose of which is to determine whether any person may have violated any provision of the laws administered by the Commission, and which is provided pursuant to any compulsory process .. .or which is provided voluntarily in place of
such compulsory process shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of
title 5.
15 U.S.C. § 57b-2(0) (1988).
134. The FTC Act here operates as an exemption substitute in the same way as statutes like the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431 (1988), and the National Security
Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403(g) (1988), serve as additional bases for claims of exemption under
the analysis in Part I. The FTC Act articulates the same foundation for nondisclosure as
FOIA's Exemption 4, and thus the analysis is comparable under either Exemption in this
circumstance.
135. A. Michael's Piano, 18 F.3d at 144.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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stated that the district court's ruling "that all voluntarily submitted
documents were exempt" was too sweeping in its nondisclosure.'38 Criticizing the lower court's ruling for denying public access to information deemed to be irrelevant to the investigation or
outside the scope of the agency's ability to compel production of
documents, the appellate court declared that "[s]uch broad exemp9
tion creates too heavy a cloak of gratuitous secrecy."2M
The court then turned to the legislative history of the FTC
Act, concluding that "while it is true that the confidentiality provision of the FTC Act was intended to encourage disclosure to the
FTC by businesses, it is also true that Congress did not intend to
create a broad exemption that -would effectively eliminate the
FTC's accountability to the public.""'' Thus, the FTC does not
create additional FOIA exemptions to the extent that the CIA
Information Act does. As additional evidence, the court quoted
statements made by Senator Cannon explaining the need for the
bill to end agency abuse of its authority: "The FTC lost sight of
the necessity to listen to the evidence and legal arguments of its
opponents. Good judgment and wisdom had been replaced with an
arrogance that seemed unparalleled among independent regulatory
agencies '1 41-though not perhaps when compared to the CIA's
positions discussed above. Thus, the court concluded that Congress
could not have "aimed to curtail the FTC's exercise of its authority and at the same time provide it with a blanket exemption from
FOIA for all documents submitted to it voluntarily.'' 142
Rather, the court proposed a new test:
[W]e think a workable standard is one that permits the FTC
properly to invoke § 21(f) by showing that (1) it had requested
documents that were (2) relevant to an ongoing investigation
within its jurisdiction and (3) the documents could have been
subpoenaed had the party refused to comply with the FTC's requests. 43
The court then remanded the matter to the district court for an
application of this test, allowing the lower court to reconsider its

138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Id. (quoting 126 CONG. REc. S11,917 (1980) (statement of Sen. Cannon)).

142.

Id.

143. Id. at 145-46.
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""
earlier result of "inadvertently limited public disclosure ....
Thus, the court further complicated confidential commercial information analysis under FOIA by inserting another test to determine
the propriety of FOIA disclosure. In articulating this new test,
moreover, the court failed to account for the diminished public
interest at stake when a business adversary manipulates FOIA's
mechanism to obtain otherwise confidential trade secrets.
In an even more recent discussion of proper Exemption 4
analysis, the court in GC Micro Corp. v. Defense Logistics Agency 145 required disclosure in an Exemption 4 case involving records documenting several federal defense contractors' use of small
disadvantaged businesses. In GC Micro, the Mexican-American
owner of a small hardware and software distributor suspected that
government contractors were failing to comply with subcontracting
goals enunciated by the Small Business Act.1 46 The Small Business Act establishes annual minimum goals for participation by
small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs) in procurement contracts,
including a requirement that no less than 5% of all contracts and
subcontracts go to SDBs. 47 To ensure compliance, contractors
are mandated under the Act to file reports detailing their participation in the Act's goals."4
GC Micro alleged that Hercules Aerospace refused to contract
with it or any other SDB and therefore requested information
from the Defense Logistics Agency regarding the implementation
and attainment of SDB goals. The requestor argued that ascertaining compliance is significant because "[ilt's a good selling tool...
to go into these contractors, target the ones that aren't meeting
[the goals, and] go in and help them meet their goal. 1 49 After
obtaining this information, GC Micro then requested disclosure of
additional information relating to contracts between the Department of Defense and Loral Aerospace, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, and Northrop Corporation. Specifically, the information
demanded consisted of the most recent filings of two particular
forms: a quarterly summary report of compliance with SDB sub-

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 146.
33 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1994).
See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1992).
Id. § 644(g)(1) (1988).
Id. § 644(h)(1).

149.

GC Micro, 33 F.3d at 1111 (quoting the district court record).
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contracting goals, including all contracts between the subject company and the government, and a semiannual contract-specific report of the estimated and actual subcontract dollars and the SDB
goals by dollar amount as well as percentage."'
The Defense Logistics Agency notified the corporations whose
records were in question and allowed them to object formally to
disclosure. The companies did not object to allowing GC Micro to
review the summary reports but refused to allow the more detailed
reports on the grounds that "this information was confidential
and ... that its disclosure would likely cause them substantial
competitive harm."'' The DLA then followed these guidelines,
withholding only the contract-specific financial reports under FOIA
Exemption 4. Although the withheld reports did include information about estimated and actual dollars spent on SDB contracts as
well as other subcontracts, they did not detail "how the contractor
is subcontracting the work, [or] ... the subject matter of the
prime contract or subcontracts, the number of subcontracts, the
items or services subcontracted, or the subcontractors' locations or
identities."'5 After GC Micro filed suit to obtain the information
contained in these reports, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the DLA, finding that the data was confidential under Exemption 4."'
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. Applying the National
Parks test to determine confidentiality," 4 the court concluded
that the documents were not properly classified as confidential." 5
GC Micro persuaded the court that disclosure would advance congressional intent to augment SDB participation in government contracts. 56 The court rejected the DLA's argument that the information contained within the summary reports constituted all information required to ascertain compliance. 7 Significantly, the
court rejected the DLA's assertion that the purpose behind the
request was irrelevant to a determination of confidentiality under

150. Id.
151. Id.
152.

Id.

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 1112.
See supra text accompanying note 91.
GC Micro, 33 F.3d at 1115.
Id. at 1113.
I&
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Exemption 4.158 The court emphasized that under the objective

National Parks test for confidentiality, "whether the information is
of a type which would normally be made available to the public,
or whether the government has promised to keep the information
confidential, is not dispositive under Exemption 4 " '159In particular, the court explained that disclosing the information contained
in the reports "would enable 'the public to evaluate the wisdom
and efficiency of federal programs and expenditures,' as well as an
executive agency's compliance with federal law."'"
In considering the nature of the evidence proffered by DLA
to support its claim of confidentiality, the court reiterated the
established rule that "evidence revealing (1) actual competition
and (2) a likelihood of substantial competitive injury is sufficient

to bring commercial information under Exemption 4."' 161 As evi-

dence, the DLA included declarations by its officers to the effect
that disclosing the reports would harm "the corporations' competitive positions because it would provide competitors with a
roadmap of the corporations' subcontracting plans and strategies."' 62 Specifically, the companies argued through the DLA
that their competitors could use detailed profiles of the use of
small businesses in subcontracts to "win contracts away from them
by promising the DLA that they would subcontract to a greater
of SDB's than the three contractors had in the
percentage
163
past.'
GC Micro countered with the argument that the information
comprising the reports is much too general and contains "too
many fluctuating variables for competitors to gain any advantage
from ...

disclosure."'"

The court agreed with GC Micro, con-

cluding that
[the] dehow
to
show
failed
has
the
DLA
executives,
fense company
despite the rather conclusory statements made by ...
analysis of the data listed ...

would provide competitors with a

profile of exactly how a defense contractor conducts its business
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting Racal-Milgo Gov't Sys., Inc. v. Small Business Administration, 559 F.
Supp. 4, 6 (D.D.C. 1981)).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1114.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1115.
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with regard to the use of SDB's in various types of government
contracts. 165

The court stressed that data on the percentage and dollar amount
of work subcontracted out to SDB's on each defense contract
"would provide little if any help to competitors attempting to
estimate and undercut the contractors' bids."'1 Thus, although
there is no mandate that the DLA "engage in a sophisticated economic analysis of the substantial competitive harm to its contractors that might result from disclosure,"'167 the Agency must nonetheless adduce enough proof of a potential of substantial competitive harm.
The court concluded that this burden had not been met and
thus "that FOIA's strong presumption in favor of disclosure
trumps the contractors' right to privacy."'1' In reviewing the
DLA's evidence, the court noted that "[i]t is questionable whether
the declarations submitted by the three contractors show any potential for competitive harm, let alone substantial harm. ' 169 The
court insisted on its conclusion because "Congress did not pass Exemption 4 to protect large corporations from persistent computer
salespeople."17 On the other hand, Congress certainly did not
enact FOIA as a means for businesses to find out more information about industrial competitors without some check on the use of
that information. Once again, the court disregarded the central
goal of FOIA: the ability for the public to gain access to governmental records in order to achieve fuller democratic self-rule.
While GC Micro came closer to inquiring about the actual workings of governmental regulatory agencies than did the FOIA requestor in A. Michael's Piano, the courts in both cases failed to
interpret FOIA in light of its overriding purpose.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 1114-15.
Id. at 1115.
Id.
Id.
ld.

170. Id.
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III. REMEDYING THE ABOVE CRITICISMS

A.

The Need for Accommodating the Guiding Purpose of FOIA
in Balancing Analysis

The difficulty in reconciling the courts' treatment of the cases
discussed above lies in their failure to fully consider the guiding
purpose of FOIA when balancing interests as mandated by these
cases. The first step in forging a more coherent FOIA jurisprudence is to accommodate the central purpose of the Act in all
FOIA analysis. Consideration of the reasons for FOIA's existence
should comprise an element of any test or discussion of a
challenged FOIA request. The problem inherent with the courts'
creation of a near-blanket exemption for the CIA is that it thwarts
the very reason for FOIA's existence-access to otherwise unobtainable governmental information essential to the process of democratic self-rule by an informed electorate. When the Agency has
the ability to determine conclusively its own exemption from disclosure, the "people who mean to be their own Governors" cannot
"arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives."'' The
problematic aspect of the courts' analysis under Exemption 4 is
that it achieves precisely the opposite result and this ignores
FOIA's purpose. Instead of distorting the fundamental purpose of
FOIA by failing to provide meaningful review of exemption
claims, the courts achieve the same result by compelling disclosure
of information when the guiding purpose of FOIA does not
sanction it.
Disclosure of the private information at issue in the Exemption 4 cases discussed above relates in no way to the ability of the
citizenry to inform itself about governmental affairs. Rather, the
cases were brought by other business organizations seeking confidential financial information belonging to their competitors that
the government happens to be safeguarding. By compelling these
documents to be shared with the public, the courts again contravene the basic principle of FOIA-access to governmental information in order to promote viable democratic self-rule. Thus, the
courts have strayed to both extremes in their misinterpretation of
FOIA; they have sanctioned the withholding of properly disclos-

171.

Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, supra note 3.
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able information by the CIA, and they have mandated disclosure
of confidential business information when it is not warranted by
Exemption 4.
The Supreme Court specified the fundamental purpose of
FOIA with precision in Department of Justice v. Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press,172 stating that the public interest
at stake in FOIA cases and indeed the reason for the Act's existence is "the citizens' right to be informed about 'what their government is up to.'"
Under this formulation, the court suggested that FOIA analysis is appropriate for those requests in which a
plaintiff acting in her capacity as a citizen demands access to governmental documents relevant to the process of self-government.
This standard seems to preclude the bizarre results under Exemption 4 analysis in which a private business competitor co-opts the
FOIA mechanism of access for his personal gain without accruing
any benefit to the public's need for knowledge. Furthermore, by
articulating the primacy of the concern about public access to vital
governmental information, this formulation by the Court suggests a
different result in CIA cases as well. In the context of CIA-FOIA
requests, the principle behind FOIA's enactment is genuinely at
issue. Access to information about foreign affairs falls squarely
within the scope of what citizens need to learn to determine "what
their government is up to." The remaining text of FOIA is not
rendered void by this interpretation, of course. Proper exemptions,
if analyzed with meaningful judicial review, may be appropriate to
shield sensitive national security secrets from devastating public
disclosure. Meaningful judicial review would demand greater factual specificity in Agency affidavits, an articulation of the specific
harm posed by disclosure, increased use of in camera inspections,
and a generally more rigorous approach to the difficult task of
balancing the competing interests. By emphasizing the relevance of
this information to the fundamental purpose of FOIA, the courts
would avoid thwarting the expressed will of Congress by creating a
near-blanket exemption for the CIA." By looking to the rea-

172. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
173. Id. at 773 (citations omitted).
174. A change which would eliminate such a disastrous result is
in light of the court's extraordinary acknowledgment in Hunt that
short step [from] exempting all CIA records' from FOIA ...[and]
be contrary to what Congress intended." Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d
1992) (quoting the district court decision).

particularly necessary
"we are now 'only a
[t]hat result may well
1116, 1120 (9th Cir.
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sons for engaging in the analysis in the first place, the judicial role
in FOIA jurisprudence could become more principled, and a better
balance could be struck between the competing interests inherent
in FOIA and its exemptions.
B. Suggestions for Reform in the CIA Context
Under this approach, the first inquiry should be whether disclosure of the requested information would further FOIA's fundamental purpose in a meaningful way. This question is particularly
apt in a CIA case because the records at issue often directly affect
the electorate's ability to be informed about its government's activ-

ities. Next, courts must tailor their analyses to the specific exemptions at issue. Particularly in the context of the CIA, the courts

must not only incorporate the fundamental purpose of FOIA in
their analysis, but in light of this purpose, they also must engage

in genuinely substantive review of the issues. If FOIA's purpose
would be furthered by granting the request, the court must then
evaluate the Agency's claims for exemption.
In so doing, the court must engage in considered review and
must demand factual specifics to the greatest extent possible from
the CIA. It is inappropriate for a court like the one in Hunt to
accept the Agency's own conclusion without explaining with rea-

In addition to the Court's expression of the fundamental public interest at stake in
FOIA in Reporters' Committee, a recent article expounds in greater depth on the central
purpose of FOIA. The authors also argue that the fundamental purpose of FOIA needs
to be accommodated in judicial analysis of these cases: "The government tramples the
privacy rights and confidential interests of individuals and organizations when it complies
with requests seeking information about private citizens and organizations, rather than
about the government." Fred H. Cate, et al., The Right to Privacy and the Public's Right
to Know: The "Central Purpose" of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REv.
41, 65 (1994). Also significant in this article is the discussion of a tripartite structure to
FOIA's fundamental purpose:
FOIA is intended to provide the citizenry with the knowledge necessary to
govern. Although there is no single statement in the Act's legislative history of
the necessary extent of that knowledge, it is clear that Congress envisioned at
least three roles of the electorate for which the Act was designed to guarantee
access to government information. First and most important, the FOIA plainly
facilitates the watchdog function of the public over the government: The public
must have access to the government information necessary to ensure that government officials act in the public interest ....
Second ....
the FOIA was
intended to assure the public's access to government information concerning
public policy. . . . Third, the authors of the FOIA wanted to ensure that the
government would not secretly create or enforce laws or administrative regulations.
Id. at 42.
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sonable factual specificity the grounds for its refusal. Courts should
require a higher factual basis in the Agency's assertion of exemption. In order to make these often difficult determinations, courts
must be provided with a minimum level of detailed information-at least for their own review in camera-to evaluate the
issue effectively. This higher standard would not compromise the
Agency's interest in secrecy because it does not require disclosure
of genuinely sensitive information. Rather, it requires only a genuine factual basis for the CIA's conclusion, something lacking in
recent decisions.
It is inappropriate for a court to be so deferential to the
Agency's determination that the conclusion is clearly contrary to
Congress's intent in enacting FOIA. The courts must be accountable to congressional intent. It is unnecessary-and would be quite
extraordinary-to require Congress to amend FOIA to effectuate
public disclosure of information in appropriate cases. Courts may
properly defer to the CIA's judgment in matters going to the
heart of national security issues because of the Agency's superior
knowledge. That deference, however, has deviated from a respect
for another branch's superior ability to assess potential damage of
disclosure to a near absolute abdication of judicial review.
These suggestions for a jurisprudence that is more consistent
with FOIA's guiding purpose are derived from the architecture of
the statute itself. The design of FOIA with de novo review and
carefully delineated exceptions to the presumptive rule of disclosure already requires the Agency to act in compliance. Congress
cannot be required to amend the Act simply to express that it
meant what it said in the first place. With correctly drafted
Vaughn affidavits, judiciously requested in camera review of challenged information, and substantive review by the courts, judges
would be better able to make the careful decisions that FOIA
requests for CIA documents demand of them. It seems impossible
that genuine review by the courts would result in acquiescence to
the Agency determinations in every case, as currently exists. Neither is there reason to believe that the CIA would be required to
compromise genuinely sensitive information that reveals intelligence sources and methods. The plain language of FOIA Exemption 1 and the statutes qualifying under Exemption 3 preclude
such a breach of security, especially when coupled with a considered and principled analysis of the fundamental purpose of FOIA
and the countervailing interests at stake.
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C. Suggestion for Reform in the Confidential Commercial Information Context
In the context of FOIA's exemption of confidential commercial information from disclosure, it is imperative that courts clarify
and unify their analyses to prevent the recurrence of the erratic
and unprincipled results of recent cases. The National Parks
test 75 needs to be reworked in a meaningful way so as to better
comport with the guiding purposes of FOIA. Just as in the CIA
analysis, the first step in a new framework for Exemption 4 cases
requires consideration of the fundamental purpose of FOIA's
enactment. The central purpose of the Act, the ability of the electorate to keep itself informed about key governmental activities,
should form the cornerstone of the analysis. In particular, courts
assessing confidential commercial information cases need to apply
a more detailed standard gauging the reasons for the government's
possession of the data in question.
The voluntary-involuntary distinction of National Parks76 is
useful because it indicates two distinct roles that the government
plays in this context. In the first role, the government is the passive collector of information, resembling a central repository or
archive for other users (or for its own future use) more than a
party with a substantial interaction with the companies. In GC
Micro,'77 the government obtained its information in this capacity; it was simply compiling the data and not actively ,pursuing the
information as part of an investigation. In the second role, the
government is an active participant in an investigation or other proceeding involving the business information, such as the FTC investigation at issue in A. Michael's Piano.7 ' Only when the govern-

ment is acting in its second role is the purpose of FOIA furthered
by public disclosure of the information; only when pursuing the
information in this active way is the electorate actually being informed about its government's activities.
This distinction-clearer than the messy voluntary-involuntary
National Parks language-is only part of the necessary inquiry. It
is important to consider not only how the government obtained
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See
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the information at issue but also the related question of how the
requestor intends to use the information. Other FOIA issues do
not require the requestor to state grounds for approving the request, so an amendment may be necessary in this circumstance.
Such an amendment would be appropriate, however, to ensure the
proper use of this very sensitive-and very private-information.
Requiring that the requestor's proposed use of the information
contribute to the guiding purpose of FOIA would prevent FOIA
from being used as a tool in industrial espionage. Granting the
request in that case did nothing to further the electorate's ability
to inform itself about the workings of its government. The information was purely private in nature and the motive behind the request-essentially industrial espionage-did not advance the
public's ability to know what its government was doing. Instead,
the request in that case completely co-opted the FOIA mechanism
for private gain. An amendment requiring the requestor to state
appropriate grounds for the demand for disclosure would eliminate
this danger and would keep confidential information out of the
hands of those intending to use it for improper purposes. In the
absence of such an amendment, the courts must heighten the scrutiny of these requests and adhere as closely as possible to the
fundamental purpose of FOIA in determining whether disclosure is
proper when requested. The government's interest in a continuing
ability to obtain this information and the supplier's interest preventing substantial harm to its competitive position-the interests
outlined in the original text of National Parks179 -must still be
protected. In so doing, however, courts should consider the role of
the government inquiry and the purpose of the request instead of
the murky voluntary-involuntary analysis.
CONCLUSION

Recent FOIA jurisprudence demonstrates the Act's-or at
least its enforcers'-failure to accommodate successfully the conflicting public right to access and the governmental and private
rights to privacy. The theoretical underpinning of FOIA has been
distorted by its proponents, critics, and manipulators alike. Instead
of forging a new mechanism by which American democratic selfrule can achieve fuller realization, the courts in their patchwork

179. See supra text accompanying note 91.
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analysis have only contributed to FOIA's inefficacy. In spite of the
lofty rhetoric trumpeted by its supporters,"s FOIA rarely contributes to the awareness of the electorate. Particularly in the
areas of national security information and commercial trade secrets, the courts have not been able to articulate standards of
administration that adequately further congressional intent behind
FOIA. With near complete judicial abrogation of responsibility in
cases where the CIA challenges disclosure and with increasingly
convoluted rationales and results in cases where confidential commercial and financial information are at issue, FOIA's ability to
achieve a workable mechanism for public access to certain governmental information has been severely impeded.

180. In a scathing attack on the cost-benefit problems of FOIA's administration, nowJustice Scalia commented: "Through the mutually reinforcing praise of many who should
know better, the act is paraded about with the veneration normally reserved for the First
Amendment itself." Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes,
REG., Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 14, 15.

